应用安全性改进计划
使用集合让一切井井有条
根据您的偏好保存内容并对其进行分类。
应用安全性改进计划是向 Google Play 应用开发者提供的一项服务,用于提高其应用的安全性。该计划会提供关于构建更安全应用的提示和建议,并指出您的应用在上传到 Google Play 后需要采取增强措施的潜在安全漏洞。迄今为止,该计划已帮助开发者在 Google Play 上修复了超过 100 万款应用。
工作方式
在任何应用获准在 Google Play 上发布之前,我们都会对其进行安全扫描,包括扫描潜在的安全问题。我们还会持续不断地反复扫描 Google Play 上超过 100 万款的应用,以查找其他威胁。
如果您的应用被标记为存在潜在安全问题,我们会立即通知您,以帮助您快速解决该问题并确保用户安全。我们会使用电子邮件和 Google Play 管理中心向您发送提醒,并提供指向支持页面的链接,其中详细说明了如何改进应用。
通常,这些通知会包含尽快向用户提供改进的时间表。对于某些类型的问题,我们可能会要求您先改进应用的安全性,然后才能发布应用的更多更新。
您可以向 Google Play 管理中心上传新版本的应用,以确认您已完全解决了相应问题。请务必递增已修复应用的版本号。过几个小时后,请在 Play 管理中心检查安全提醒;如果提醒已不存在,就表示没有任何问题。
Play 管理中心内某个应用的安全性改进提醒示例。
参与其中
此计划的成功取决于我们与您(Google Play 上的应用开发者)以及安全社区的合作。我们都有责任为用户提供安全可靠的应用。如有任何反馈或疑问,请通过 Google Play 开发者帮助中心与我们联系。如需报告应用中的潜在安全问题,请通过 security+asi@android.com
与我们联系。
活动和修复
下面是 Google Play 应用开发者需注意的最新安全问题。点击各活动的支持页面链接即可查看漏洞和修复详情。
表 1:警告活动及相关的修复期限。
活动
|
已开始
|
支持页面
|
公开的 Firebase Cloud Messaging 服务器密钥
|
10/12/2021
|
支持页面
|
Intent 重定向
|
5/16/2019
|
支持页面
|
JavaScript 界面注入
|
12/4/2018
|
支持页面
|
配置盗用
|
11/15/2018
|
支持页面
|
跨应用脚本
|
10/30/2018
|
支持页面
|
文件级跨网站脚本
|
6/5/2018
|
支持页面
|
SQL 注入
|
6/4/2018
|
支持页面
|
路径遍历
|
9/22/2017
|
支持页面
|
主机名验证不安全
|
11/29/2016
|
支持页面
|
Fragment 注入
|
11/29/2016
|
支持页面
|
Supersonic 广告 SDK
|
9/28/2016
|
支持页面
|
Libpng
|
6/16/2016
|
支持页面
|
Libjpeg-turbo
|
6/16/2016
|
支持页面
|
Vpon 广告 SDK
|
6/16/2016
|
支持页面
|
Airpush 广告 SDK
|
3/31/2016
|
支持页面
|
MoPub 广告 SDK
|
3/31/2016
|
支持页面
|
OpenSSL(“logjam”和 CVE-2015-3194、CVE-2014-0224)
|
3/31/2016
|
支持页面
|
TrustManager
|
2/17/2016
|
支持页面
|
AdMarvel
|
2/8/2016
|
支持页面
|
Libupup (CVE-2015-8540)
|
2/8/2016
|
支持页面
|
Apache Cordova (CVE-2015-5256、CVE-2015-1835)
|
12/14/2015
|
支持页面
|
Vitamio 广告 SDK
|
12/14/2015
|
支持页面
|
GnuTLS
|
10/13/2015
|
支持页面
|
Webview SSLErrorHandler
|
7/17/2015
|
支持页面
|
Vungle 广告 SDK
|
6/29/2015
|
支持页面
|
Apache Cordova(CVE-2014-3500、CVE-2014-3501 和 CVE-2014-3502)
|
6/29/2015
|
支持页面
|
表 2:仅发出警告的活动(无修复期限)。
活动
|
已开始
|
支持页面
|
隐式 PendingIntent
|
2/22/2022
|
支持页面
|
隐式内部 intent
|
6/22/2021
|
支持页面
|
不安全的加密模式
|
10/13/2020
|
支持页面
|
不安全的加密模式
|
9/17/2019
|
支持页面
|
Zipfile 路径遍历
|
5/21/2019
|
支持页面
|
嵌入式 Foursquare OAuth 令牌
|
9/28/2016
|
支持页面
|
嵌入式 Facebook OAuth 令牌
|
9/28/2016
|
支持页面
|
Google Play 结算服务拦截
|
7/28/2016
|
支持页面
|
嵌入式 Google 刷新令牌 OAuth
|
7/28/2016
|
支持页面
|
开发者网址泄露凭据
|
6/16/2016
|
支持页面
|
嵌入式密钥库文件
|
10/2/2014
|
|
Amazon Web Services 嵌入式凭据
|
6/12/2014
|
|
本页面上的内容和代码示例受内容许可部分所述许可的限制。Java 和 OpenJDK 是 Oracle 和/或其关联公司的注册商标。
最后更新时间 (UTC):2023-12-13。
[[["易于理解","easyToUnderstand","thumb-up"],["解决了我的问题","solvedMyProblem","thumb-up"],["其他","otherUp","thumb-up"]],[["没有我需要的信息","missingTheInformationINeed","thumb-down"],["太复杂/步骤太多","tooComplicatedTooManySteps","thumb-down"],["内容需要更新","outOfDate","thumb-down"],["翻译问题","translationIssue","thumb-down"],["示例/代码问题","samplesCodeIssue","thumb-down"],["其他","otherDown","thumb-down"]],["最后更新时间 (UTC):2023-12-13。"],[],[],null,["# App security improvement program\n\nThe App Security Improvement program is a service provided to Google Play\napp developers to improve the security of their apps. The program provides\ntips and recommendations for building more secure apps and identifies\npotential security enhancements when your apps are uploaded to Google\nPlay. To date, the program has facilitated developers to fix over\n1,000,000 apps on Google Play.\n\nHow it works\n------------\n\n\nBefore any app is accepted into Google Play, we scan it for safety and\nsecurity, including potential security issues. We also continuously re-scan\nthe over one million apps on Google Play for additional threats.\n\n\nIf your app is flagged for a potential security issue, we'll notify you\nimmediately to help you quickly address the issue and help keep your users\nsafe. We'll deliver alerts to you using both email and the Google Play\nConsole, with links to a support page with details about how to\nimprove the app.\n\n\nTypically, these notifications will include a timeline for delivering the\nimprovement to users as quickly as possible. For some kinds of issues, we\nmay require you to make security improvements in the app before you can\npublish any more updates to it.\n\n\nYou can confirm that you've fully addressed the issue by uploading the new\nversion of your app to the Google Play Console. Be sure to [increment the version number](/studio/publish/versioning) of the\nfixed app. After a few hours, check the Play Console for the security\nalert; if it's no longer there, you're all set. \n\nExample of a security improvement alert for\nan app in the Play Console.\n\nGet involved\n------------\n\n\nThe success of this program rests on our partnership with you---the developers\nof apps on Google Play---and the security community. We're all responsible for\nproviding safe, secure apps to our users. For feedback or questions, please\nreach out to us through the [Google\nPlay Developer Help Center](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/contact/publishing). To report potential security issues in apps,\nplease reach out to us at `security+asi@android.com`.\n\nCampaigns and remediations\n--------------------------\n\n\nBelow are the most recent security issues flagged to developers on\nGoogle Play. Vulnerability and remediation details are available\nin each campaign's support page link.\n\n\n**Table 1**: Warning campaigns with associated deadline for remediation.\n\n| Campaign | Started | Support Page |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Exposed Firebase Cloud Messaging Sever Keys | 10/12/2021 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/topic/11015404) |\n| Intent Redirection | 5/16/2019 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/9267555) |\n| JavaScript Interface Injection | 12/4/2018 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/9095419) |\n| Scheme Hijacking | 11/15/2018 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/9101196) |\n| Cross App Scripting | 10/30/2018 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/9084685) |\n| File-based Cross-Site Scripting | 6/5/2018 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7668153) |\n| SQL Injection | 6/4/2018 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7668308) |\n| Path Traversal | 9/22/2017 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7496913) |\n| Insecure Hostname Verification | 11/29/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7188426) |\n| Fragment Injection | 11/29/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7188427) |\n| Supersonic Ad SDK | 9/28/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7126517) |\n| Libpng | 6/16/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7011127) |\n| Libjpeg-turbo | 6/16/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7008337) |\n| Vpon Ad SDK | 6/16/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7012047) |\n| Airpush Ad SDK | 3/31/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/6376737) |\n| MoPub Ad SDK | 3/31/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/6345928) |\n| OpenSSL (\"logjam\" and CVE-2015-3194, CVE-2014-0224) | 3/31/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/6376725) |\n| TrustManager | 2/17/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/6346016) |\n| AdMarvel | 2/8/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/6345881) |\n| Libupup (CVE-2015-8540) | 2/8/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/6346109) |\n| Apache Cordova (CVE-2015-5256, CVE-2015-1835) | 12/14/2015 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/6325474) |\n| Vitamio Ad SDK | 12/14/2015 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/6365106) |\n| GnuTLS | 10/13/2015 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/6344084) |\n| Webview SSLErrorHandler | 7/17/2015 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7071387) |\n| Vungle Ad SDK | 6/29/2015 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/6313713) |\n| Apache Cordova (CVE-2014-3500, CVE-2014-3501, CVE-2014-3502) | 6/29/2015 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/6325474) |\n\n\n**Table 2**: Warning-only campaigns (no remediation deadline).\n\n| Campaign | Started | Support Page |\n|------------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Implicit PendingIntent | 2/22/2022 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/10437428) |\n| Implicit Internal Intent | 6/22/2021 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/10399926) |\n| Unsafe Encryption Mode | 10/13/2020 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/10046138) |\n| Unsafe Encryption | 9/17/2019 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/9450925) |\n| Zipfile Path Traversal | 5/21/2019 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/9294009) |\n| Embedded Foursquare OAuth Token | 9/28/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7050471) |\n| Embedded Facebook OAuth Token | 9/28/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7126515) |\n| Google Play Billing interception | 7/28/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7054270) |\n| Embedded Google Refresh Token OAuth | 7/28/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7052200) |\n| Developer URL Leaked Credentials | 6/16/2016 | [Support page](https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7026406) |\n| Embedded Keystore files | 10/2/2014 | |\n| Amazon Web Services embedded credentials | 6/12/2014 | |"]]